asia

One of the "ironies" cited by critics of American foreign policy is that America's support for the mujahedin during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union ultimately led to the emergence of Osama bin Laden and his terrorist network who then turned against the United States. But the truth is more complicated than that; America's foreign policy towards Afghanistan during the 1980s and 1990s was always distant. In the 1980s, the policy was aimed at the attrition (and then expulsion) of the Soviet forces, by using the resources and cover of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). After that, America's policy slipped into mere indifference, that is, until September 11, 2001.

Tracing the evolution of America's engagement in Afghanistan from 1979 is the subject of Steven Coll's "Ghost Wars." Mr. Coll, a Pulitzer-Prize winning journalist and managing editor of the Washington Post, has written a detailed and compelling narrative that weaves together decades' worth of interest in the region. The book is divided into three parts: first comes the period from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 until its withdrawal in 1989; second, the period after 1989 until January 1998, before the CIA first drafted plans to arrest and kill Osama bin Laden; and third, the period from January 1998 to September 10, 2001, which included al Qaeda attacks against the US in Kenya, Tanzania, and Yemen.

The end product is elegant, well written, and very informative. Written, obviously, for people who care about details, "Ghost Wars" has thorough narratives of the various relationships that defined America's engagement in the region: its bizarre and often hostile relationship with Pakistan's ISI, its connection with Saudi Arabia, and its various agreements with different fighters of the post-Soviet war. From this story, it becomes evident how and when bin Laden started to emerge as a powerful figure, what America tried to do about it, and how its efforts were frustrated by politics at home and abroad.

In all, "Ghost Wars" will fill many gaps by delving into more detail than other books on the topic. Written with a journalist's style, "Ghost Wars" refrains from grand analytical connections and broad themes that try to bring everything together. Still, Mr. Coll does insert some analysis at times, helping alleviate the burden of continuous story-telling. This sporadic analysis, combined with the excellent narrative, should place "Ghost Wars" on everyone's reading list on the war on terror.

This absorbing new book,"Ghost Wars", written by noted journalist Steve Coll, managing editor of the Washington Post, deftly describes and explains the origins, progress, and consequences of the CIA's ill-fated sponsorship of radical Muslim fundamentalists in a concerted effort to turn the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the late 1970s into a Russian version of Vietnam. The devil lies in the details, as they say, and Mr. Coll does a yeoman's job of explaining how the specific actions taken by the United States to influence the long term course of the Soviet aggression against the Afghan people wrought the absolutely catastrophic unintended consequences it did by way of the creation, training and sustenance of the fanatical Arab fringe group that eventually emerged in the early 1990s as Al Queda.

Indeed, it is a tale full of unimaginable arrogance, thoughtless irresponsibility, and ultimate irony that many of the so-called masterminds of the various Arab groups loosely held together by Osama bin Laden's terrorist network were originally recruited, trained, and transported to Afghanistan by the CIA and its front organizations, and many of the most sophisticated of their members learned their tradecraft here in the United States in training courses offered and funded by the CIA. Operating with the cooperation of a number of other national security organizations such as the KGB, the Saudi General Intelligence Department, and the dreaded Pakistani ISI, the covert agents of the Central Intelligence Agency played a dangerous game in creating an effective and often deadly counterforce to the brunt instrument of the Soviet military machine, and by creating the guerilla forces to do so, gave radical Muslim fundamentalists an object lesson in how to fight quite effectively against superior military forces.

In this fashion, the success enjoyed by the Arab terrorists in fighting against the Soviets encouraged them to think about how they could use their newfound capabilities to engage the forces that be within the orbit of the Middle East itself to effect change towards the creation of a theocratic fundamentalist Muslim state, or even a loose confederation, or Caliphate, of them, by employing such terrorist tactics against both the Western powers and (eventually) the Saudi royal family to accomplish their goals. It took us a while to recognize that the rag-tag confederation of Arab 'freedom fighters baptized by combat in Afghanistan were now forming into a most formidable and extremely dangerous enemy, one that could hide at pleasure and strike when it suited them best.Moreover, one of the most interesting aspects to the book is the way in which the author threads the story of the growing and evolving threat of Al Queda into the history of what is also transpiring in Afghanistan over that quarter century of time.

Had we not cut and run, for example, after helping to defeat the Soviets, had we stayed behind to aid them in rebuilding the shattered country the Soviets left in their wake, we might have been able to do much to disarm the radical Muslim movement from gaining traction in the first place. Instead, we abandoned them to their misery and incredible tribal hatreds and animosities, and by so doing provided a haven in which radical Muslim fundamentalists could come to power, and thus creating a perfect setting for all that Al Queda did afterward. In tracing the sordid history of how these so-called ghost wars led to what happened later, eventuating in the attacks of the late 1990s and the events of 911, Coll argues powerfully for a more informed, logical, and rational foreign policy, one informed by a keen understanding of the world and our place in it. Until such transformation takes place, our country and we will continue to be at great risk. Enjoy!

The elusiveness of Bin Laden and the failures of the US government to get him is the theme of this great book. Coll has produced a masterpiece of investigative journalism. His book is amply documented and footnoted. However, some of his crucial interviews are left anonymous or unattributed and the identities of these sources would be very valuable to an evaluation of the overall history of this period.

Coll paints a broad and detailed picture of intelligence operations from the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR up to the attacks upon the World Trade Center in 2001, and he clearly shows how the US effort to defeat the USSR in that country, eventually led to the rise of Bin Laden and Muslim radicalism. The United States and Saudi Arabia gave huge amounts of government largesse to fund the radical Muslims, who did all the fighting and dying to defeat the Communists. Too much credit is given to Reagan for "defeating" Soviet Communism and little is said about the actual people who died for the Muslim cause of defeating the infidels. Also, little is said about the law of unintended consequences, wherein the rise of the radical Muslim mentality was originally fostered via the US strategy by Reagan and his CIA chief William Casey. So in this connection, Bin Laden and 9/11 is a form of "blowback".

The picture painted by Coll of intelligence agents trying to get Bin Laden is curious indeed, since the effort to track him and corner him was very good at times, yet when he could have been caught or killed, the agents backed out or the intelligence agencies seemed paralyzed to follow through. This seems like a fruitful area of study for further books searching for the real truth of this secret history.

Coll's book addresses the usage of the funds to finance the radical groups fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan, however, not much hard information is offered to show exactly who siphoned money to Bin Laden and how much was diverted to his groups(s). The unspoken assumption is that Pakistan's intelligence service, (ISI) was responsible for this diversion. In addition, it seems the author implies the US did not really know which groups were receiving US funds. This is a murky subject area which further research would clarify and make accessible to the American people.

I recommend this book to those interested in this sordid and ironic period of US history. The book is long but well worth the read, since it will impart much enlightenment about CIA behavior and the reader will be armed with a better understanding of what must be done to avoid this kind of catastrophe again.