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Professor Gaddis's course on the Cold War at Yale is, without a doubt, the most popular class offered, attracting probably 800-1000 (one-fifth of undergraduates) people before it must be capped at a still staggering 400, and rightfully so: an un-assuming fellow, he is a well-known and brilliant historian with a knack for writing and teaching. His book, We Now Know, is an outstanding piece of historical scholarship on the origins of the Cold War and how it played out in the years before the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is carefully argued and well-documented. He approaches all sides of the Cold War, including the sometimes overlooked role China played in the early Cold War, not to mention the attention he gives to nuclear weapons and the third world, for example. Gaddis's writing is very accessible, and he draws many insightful parallels and analogies which aid in understanding even the most complicated of events and theories. While I think those with at least a basic background in Cold War history would appreciate the book and its interpretations more, it could certainly serve as an introductory text. Gaddis is the don of modern Cold War historians, and this is nothing short of a masterpiece. I heartily recommend it.

In this book, John Lewis Gaddis sets out to describe the major structural features of the Cold War, identify their causes, provide a narrative overview of the Cold War from its inception to the Cuban Missile Crisis, and embed the Cold War in the larger context of 20th century history. Gaddis succeeds in accomplishing all these ends in a well written book of less than 300 hundred pages. This is a considerable achievement. A good part of this book is driven by the fact that the end of the Cold War has resulted in access to Soviet, Chinese, and Eastern European sources that provide information about key events and decision makers. Much prior work concentrated one sidely on Western policies and policy makers. The new archival information allows reconstruction of important decisions and a more complete picture of the Cold War. It is important to note that not all the new information relates to Communist sources. For example, based on the availability of new documentation, Gaddis presents an account of John Kennedy's behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis that varies considerably from the standard accounts.
Gaddis addresses a number of key issues. Why did the Cold War begin? He sees the Cold War as a result of Stalin's insecurity and brutal Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe. Given the conduct of Soviet Armies and Stalin's aggressive foreign policy, the USA and its Western European Allies had no choice but to respond to Stalin in some form of confrontation. Was the Cold War a conflict just between the USA and the Soviet Union? Gaddis is careful to emphasize the autonomy of many decision makers during the Cold War. Some of these are surprising. An early and important event was the declaration of independence issued by Yugoslav communists in 1948. This event infuriated Stalin and played a large role in precipitating the Stalinist repression that occurred in many Eastern European Soviet satellites, further scaring Western European governments and pushing them closer to the USA. The emergence of NATO is presented very much as driven by Western European governments with the British playing a particularly important role. Gaddis contrasts the wisdom of American policy towards Europe and Japan with the ultimate failure of the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. The Americans nourished European recovery with the Marshall plan, planted democracies in Germany and Japan, and tolerated a good deal of independence by important European partners. The Eastern European Soviet satellites, in contrast, were a chronic source of dissent and required diversion of considerable Soviet economic resources to maintain Soviet hegemony. This latter phenomena was actually predicted by the American diplomat George Kennan in the late 40s.
Gaddis deals very well with the problem of divided Germany and the expansion of the Cold War into Asia. He treats the Chinese and North Koreans as important independent forces and describes nicely the complexity of relations between the Soviets, the Chinese, and the North Koreans. Similarly, Gaddis provides a nice analysis of the expansion of the Cold War into the Third World, revealing very well how American policies, so successful in Europe and Japan, were mistaken in the Middle East and Latin America. Another topic dealt with very well is the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War. In Gaddis' view, nuclear weapons had a dual role. They reduced the chance of direct conflict between the US and the Soviet Union but provided the only arena in which it was possible for the Soviets to maintain some sort of parity with the West. The last effect considerably prolonged the Cold War.
Gaddis finishes after the Cuban missile crisis. This is a good choice for several reasons. It is likely that important documents relevant to the post-Missile Crisis period are only now emerging, so reassessment would be premature. It may be true also that in many important respects, the Cold War was over. The USA had triumphed in Western Europe and Japan, the Eastern European satellite states were a chronic headache for the Soviets, nuclear weapons had stablized the conflict, and conflicts in the 3rd world would never be crucial.
Finally, I have to address some comments made by other reviewers. Gaddis is not a right wing bigot. This is an evenhanded and fair book. It is written concisely and without literary flair but I would not describe it as dry. It is very difficult to combine narrative and analysis in a concise manner, especially when dealing with controversial topics like these. Gaddis has done an admirable job and deserves our thanks for bringing his analysis of the Cold War before the broad reading public.

a really useful book for anyone interested in the cold war. i have used this book for 2 years of study. quite humourosly written in places too. good for students or those just generally interested.