europe

Destined to be the definitive account of the causes of this conflict for years to come. The text is a concise 300 pages, broken into very short chapters of between three and ten pages each, making it a quick read. The form makes it an enjoyable history as well as lending to the clarity of the author's argument.

This is not a history of the war itself but of the background and events leading to the start of hostilities. It provides an excellent analysis of the 37 days between the assassination in Sarajevo of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the declarations of war. A must read for those who have been confused by or have trouble remembering why exactly the catastrophe took place.

The main thesis is that much of what has been accepted as conventional wisdom regarding the war's causes for the last century is misguided. High officials in the German and Austrian governments conspired to wage two wars of aggression - Austria against Serbia, Germany against Russia. These officials bear sole responsibility for the "Great War". This plot was formed well before June 28th, 1914. The date served only as a pretext for the violence previously planned by these two powers.

The author disproves several myths. One - that the war came as a complete surprise to a peaceful Europe. Two - there actually was no Schlieffen Plan. Three - that a rigid structure of alliances coupled with railway schedules and irreversible mobilization plans caused the war.

Much of the criticism of Mr. Fromkin's book from other reviewers on this site is, in the opinion of this reader, unfounded. This topic is too important and complex and encompasses too much history to be covered in a magazine article. Fromkin's research is complete. His A Peace to End All Peace should attest to his mastery of the era. Far from boring, the form only accentuates the author's case and reduces the confusing nature of the subject. Also, I'm not sure originality should be a goal in history writing - rather truth and clarity.

A simple map at the beginning and a highly useful index of all the players at the end make this a great history as well as reference. This was a long-needed book. David Fromkin is a great historian.

It was with eager anticipation that I pre-ordered this volume. Dr. Fromkin's Pullitzer nominated A Peace To End All Peace is one of the best history books I have ever read. Europe's Last Summer, in stark contrast, is one of the most poorly written histories of my acquaintance.

Structurally, Fromkin divides his 305 pages into 53 chapters, many of which are merely two pages in length. The idea was to devote each one to a point by point presentation of the many steps and relevant considerations that led to the culminating conclusions about who was responsible for starting The Great War.

What became increasingly annoying was its redundancy. Frequently the reader sees the phrases "as noted earlier" and "as quoted earlier," as Fromkin keeps saying the same handful of statements over and over and over. He tells us no fewer than eight times that German General Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) wanted Germany to confront Russia in war earlier rather than later because he perceived that Russia's French funded industrialization would gradually displace Germany as the leading military power in the world. It became maddeningly tortuous to keep reading the same statements again and again.

For most of his conclusions, he refers to the analysis of other historians. By the time I finished reading, I felt that it would have been more profitable to read those historians' books instead.

He does ultimately make some important observations. His delineation of the Great War as having been in reality two wars is a valuable insight. That he carefully identifies individual views among the decision makers for each of the Great Powers illuminates the often conflicting machinations within each of their governments. Too often histories of the period treat those governments as having acted with one voice and one mind. His portrayal of Kaiser Wilhelm and those of his subordinates who contravened him as crisis evolved is especially relevant to understanding how German policy arrived at war.

On the other hand, his overall thesis is somewhat flawed. If Austria-Hungary had acted on Germany's advice to attack Serbia quickly, then those within the German decision makers such as Moltke who desired war with Russia would have been robbed of their pretext. Ultimately, his final conclusion misses the mark at least a little bit.

This is as lucid an explanation of the tangled web European diplomats and military men weaved during the seminal summer of 1914. Fromkin does a fine job of disentangling it all and assigning motivations to the key players. It was, as he explains, pure balance of power politics, either an effort to maintain supremacy if you had it, or achieve it if you didn't. He lays the confusion as to the "causes" of WWI that have been so furiously debated for so long to what he maintains were two wars rather than one. What started as an Austria-Hungary vs Serbia war was co-opted by Germany to launch its preferred war against Russia and France.
Fromkin paints a less damning potrait of Kaiser Willie than one has become accustomed to, his fault here not infantile militarism, but that he lost control of his subordinates who executed or twisted his orders to serve their own belligerent ends.
Fromkin also argues that the "lessons" of the war that so many of Barbara Tuchman's generation grew up with, that the war started because the policy-makers lost control of events and were instead controlled by them, is false. Fromkin argues convincingly that the war started because the men in control in Austria and Germany wanted it. And he "names names" of those who were most responsible.
He absolves many of those who tried to prevent the oncoming cataclysm from blame, suggesting that it was not their incompetence that led to war but rather an unsettling fact of life: It takes two to make a peace, but only one to start a war.
Agree or not, Fromkin will leave all his readers with much to mull over after concluding this concise and convincing exposition of one of history's most contentious controversies: Who started World War One?