polar regions

Susan Solomon has tried very hard in this well-written and documented new book to exonerate Captain Robert Falcon Scott, the leader of the ill-fated Terra Nova expedition to the South Pole in 1911-1912. In recent years Scott has been accused of everything from simple incompetence to real stupidity by critics of his leadership and organization, which Solomon, an NOAA scientist with a distinguished career and Antarctic experience, clearly finds unjustified. By extensively researching not only the original documentation - diaries of Scott and his men, the expedition's meteorological records, information from other Antarctic expeditions of the day such as Shackleton's 1908-1909 try for the pole and Amundsen's successful polar bid of 1911-1912 - but also modern meteorological data, now available for some years along the entirety of Scott's route to the pole (now the course for aircraft bound for the Amundsen-Scott Station), she has tried her level best to suggest that abnormally cold weather was the deciding factor in the loss of the five-man polar party. And indeed cold weather must have been a factor. The poor weather conditions not only would have debilitated the men and caused severe frostbite, the friction of cold snow would have made it almost impossible for the men to pull their sledges more than a few miles a day. Indeed Solomon has charted the progress of the polar party, comparing it with the two supporting parties that turned back short of the pole, and her information does demonstrate how badly slowed up Scott and his four companions were.

The trouble remains, however, that while poor weather clearly contributed to the loss of Captain Scott and his men, Scott's own mistakes and poor planning were also a factor, and to her great credit Solomon does not conceal them, just as Scott, an undeniably courageous and honest man, did not conceal them in his own writings. Scott's assiduous copying of Shackleton's mistakes in 1908-09 (the use of ponies, reliance on unproven motor transport), his own short cuts (spending time testing his motor sledges but not clothing, tents, or other gear), and his failures in leadership (taking five men instead of the planned four to the pole) were instrumental, I believe, in his failure to survive the trek. One also must question why, after the blizzard that trapped the men in their tent 11 miles from a depot of food and fuel, the two well men, Dr. Wilson and the redoubtable Lt. Bowers, did not leave Scott, who was crippled by frostbite, and go to the depot for supplies or even, in the finale extremity, leave Scott to die and save themselves, something Solomon herself seems to find as mysterious as others who have pondered the question, although she advances a possible explanation.

Overall this is a very good book, the first to take into account modern knowledge of Antarctic weather and apply it to Scott's tragic expedition. Although I don't feel that the author has entirely proved her thesis, it is a valuable and useful contribution to the controversy over Captain Scott's expedition.

Susan Solomon's 400+ pages of closely reasearched and well written material can't disguise Capt. Scott's failings in leadership. He may have possessed a modern scientific outlook in his thinking, but his methodology was so often flawed that his expedition was probably doomed from the start. The PBS companion program "Secrets of the Dead" also does a great diservice to Roald Amundsen, characterizing this professional polar explorer's successful journey to the South Pole as "lucky" and "unplanned." Amundsen's achievement--traversing nearly 2000 miles of unknown territory in the harshest climate on the planet with a mixture of meticulous planning and hearty self-reliance--completely eclipses Scott's slavish & unimaginative repetition of Shackleton's route & methods. Roland Huntford's excellent "The Last Place on Earth" remains the classic study of the Amundsen/Scott polar journeys--don't read Solomon without Huntford.

This book is very readable and enjoyable, even for those familiar with Scott's story. The reason for the one star deduction is the author's half-hearted defense of Scott. Several of the examples she uses to demonstrate that Scott was not a total idiot actually confirm Scott's deficiencies. Scott's largest flaw was his inability to learn from his previous experience. In his initial foray into Antartica, he took two excursions that found him making it back barely alive. In his trip to the pole, he cut his margin of error too close yet again. The author makes a strong point that Scott had been informed by Simpson of the March temperatures and expected temperature differences further south, yet Scott did not alter his plans to accordingly.

What the author may have missed is that the Scott/Amundsen dielectic is one of the dying empire/doing it the British way with human fortitude (ie. stiff upper lip) versus a new country/adjusting to the circumstances as required. Scott was doomed by the paradigm he was working within. Amundsen represented the new paradigm that would eventually replace Scott's paradigm. Scott's failure was a harbinger of the decline of the British Empire.

The major contribution of the book is the revelation that Scott in the final days was not held back by the weather. The obvious conclusion, that the author dances around, is that Scott, due to his back frostbite and inability to go on himself, failed to follow in Oates' heroic footsteps and allow Wilson and Bowers the chance to survive. Scott's vanity and lack of courage cost may have cost them their lives. I had a very low opinion of Scott before reading this book. Knowing that Scott lied about the weather and the reason their party was stalled lowers my opinion of him further.

Someone interested in polar exploration should begin by reading The Last Place on Earth. When done with that, Solomon's book adds an interesting twist on the story.